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Abstract 
We investigate the problem of predicting the outcomes of a sequence of discrete random 
variables that are almost uniform, in the sense that they are generated from a random 
process that is designed to produce independent uniform outcomes but may not do so 
exactly.  Using assumptions based around this notion we derive a useful stochastic 
ordering.  We reject the gambler’s belief as unsound and find that the reverse gambler’s 
belief is the optimal prediction method.  This method arises under a wide class of Bayesian 
models.  One of the main contributions of this paper is that it uses only weak and intuitive 
prior assumptions and should therefore be more palatable to sceptics than existing Bayesian 
models. 
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1.  The gambler’s fallacy 
 
If an abundance of heads come up on a coin, observers may be heard to assert that 
a tail is due; that it is more likely to come up than another head.  This kind of belief or 
assertion is often called the gambler’s fallacy (or the Monte Carlo fallacy), though it 
should more properly be called the gambler’s belief when it is not accompanied by 
any proposed justification.  The term is often applied outside a gambling context and, 
at its widest, the term can be ascribed to any belief that deviations from expected 
behaviour are likely to eventually be evened out by opposite deviations. 
In statistical literature this belief has been attributed to a failure to understand 
statistical independence or to a misunderstanding of informal principles akin to 
Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers (that assert the almost sure convergence of 
expectation and sample mean for independent random variables).  Kahneman, Slovic 
and Tversky (1982) attribute the belief to a heuristic cognitive principle that they call 
the representativeness heuristic, where the probabilities of outcomes are estimated 
according to how they resemble quintessentially random-looking outcomes. 
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However, as Cowan (1969) rightly warns, the reasoning behind the gambler’s 
belief is rarely explicated and is therefore imputed by the logician: 
Thus the argument, whether valid or fallacious, and if valid, whether sound or unsound, is 
for the most part an artificial creature, a construction the logician makes to help us decide 
what evidence to look for next, for esthetic purposes, or whatever. 
In the absence of explicit reasoning for the belief it is rather presumptuous to say 
that the argument behind the gambler’s belief is unsound, and it is outright incorrect 
to say that the argument is a logical fallacy (since the latter is an error in logical 
argument that is independent of the truth of its premises).  Quite rightly, Cowan finds 
that the argument (if there is one), while often unsound, is not fallacious: 
The gambler’s argument may very well be valid in the sense that if the premises are true, 
the conclusion is also true, but in many cases the premises required are simply not true.  …  
[I]t is the logician’s job to find out what is necessary to get the conclusion.  Then we can 
see whether what would have to be true for the conclusion to be evidenced is in fact true. 
 
In fact, the usual informality of the assertion of the gambler’s belief and the lack of 
explicit reasoning sometimes makes it difficult to establish what is even being 
asserted.  The assertion of the belief is usually framed or timed so as to suggest that it 
is at least a denial of the exchangeability of observations, but even this may be 
uncertain.  Moreover, it is not always clear whether the gambler is looking to all 
previous tosses of the coin or just the last run of tosses as evidence for the conclusion 
that a tail is due.  In this paper we take the former view as our conception of the 
gambler’s belief: that is, we take the belief as being that the most likely next outcome 
is one of the outcomes that have occurred the least so far. 
 
Following Cowan’s suggestion we will demonstrate sufficient conditions that 
preclude the gambler’s belief.  We thereby find that the denial of these conditions is 
necessary for the belief.  This gives some power to the analysis by attributing to the 
gambler a minimal belief that the gambler cannot escape by failure to properly 
explicate their reasoning.  We endeavour to use only conditions that we believe are 
reasonable in the case of random processes used in gambling; this provides a 
reasonable argument against the gambler’s argument however it may be framed. 
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2.  The reverse gambler’s fallacy 
 
Continuing the coin tossing example, where we have observed an abundance of 
heads, some observers may also be heard to assert, in opposition to the gambler’s 
belief, that another head is more likely than a tail.  This opposite assertion has been 
called the reverse gambler’s fallacy though again it should more properly be called 
the reverse gambler’s belief when it is not accompanied by any proposed justification.  
Again, the term is often applied outside a gambling context and, at its widest, can be 
ascribed to any belief that deviations from expected behaviour are likely to continue. 
In statistical literature this belief has also been attributed to a failure to understand 
statistical independence so that, to its detractors, the belief is generally considered to 
be a manifestation of the same kind of unsound thinking as the gambler’s fallacy.  
However, such criticisms often themselves fail to understand statistical independence; 
many confuse causal independence with statistical independence and incorrectly use 
the former to assert the latter with simplistic (and flawed) arguments along the lines 
that “dice have no memories”. 
 
3.  The Bayesian approach 
 
The notion that successive outcomes are produced in an identical manner is, quite 
literally, described by the assumption of exchangeability.  In random processes with a 
finite number of possible outcomes this gives rise to a multinomial model with 
unknown long-run proportions of outcomes.  Under standard Bayesian multinomial 
models using either the reference prior or symmetric conjugate prior (both of which 
are special cases of the Dirichlet prior) it can be shown that the reverse gambler’s 
belief arises as the correct posterior conclusion.  The implications of these models are 
well known.  What is not known is, in Cowan’s words: “what is necessary to get the 
conclusion”.  This turns out not to be particularly instructive and so we instead find 
weaker sufficient conditions that also imply the reverse gambler’s belief.  Again we 
endeavour to use only conditions that we believe are reasonable in the case of random 
processes used in gambling.  One of the main contributions of this paper is that it uses 
only weak and intuitive prior assumptions and should therefore be more palatable to 
sceptics than existing Bayesian models. 
 3
A note of caution is needed here.  We do not intend to assert that advocates of the 
reverse gambler’s belief are necessarily reasoning correctly; their reasoning may 
indeed be unsound or even fallacious.  What we do intend is to show that their beliefs 
may be justifiable by the reasoning that we present.  Again we stress that in the 
absence of explicit reasoning it is rather presumptuous to label a belief as unsound or 
fallacious. 
 
4.  Modelling almost uniform sequences 
 
Throughout our analysis we will follow the notation in Bernardo and Smith (1994); 
in particular, we will not make any notational distinction between known values 
(constants) and unknown values (random variables) and we will not make any 
distinction between mass functions and density functions.  This will not lead us into 
any trouble since the arguments that we present will not rely on continuity and can be 
considered totally in terms of general probability measures.  The processes of interest 
can be described formally as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 1 (Preliminary definitions): Let ( )1 2 3, , ,...x x x≡x  be a sequence of 
values each with the same finite range 1  and let , 2,..., m ( )1 2, ,...,k kx x x≡x  be the 
observed outcomes.  To facilitate easier discussion we denote the observed counts by 
 with ( ) ( )1 2, ,...,k mn n n≡n x ( ) ( )1ki i k jjn n I x i=≡ ≡ =∑x , and we denote the long-run 
proportions by ( ) ( )1 2, ,..., mθ θ θ≡ ≡xθ θ  with ( ) ( )limi i i kk nθ θ →∞≡ ≡x x k .  Finally, we 
let ( ) (  1kp x p x x+≡ = x )k  be the predictive probability of interest. 
 
In modelling sequences where each outcome is produced in the same way it may 
be reasonable to assume that the order of the outcomes is always uninformative so 
that  is exchangeable.  We note immediately that the exchangeability of  is 
fundamental to the results of the paper and that finite exchangeability will be 
insufficient; this may be taken as a possible criticism of the model, though we note 
that this assumption is weaker than, and is implied by the assumptions underlying 
existing models. 
x x
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5.  The common approach to modelling almost uniform sequences 
 
When we are modelling processes that are designed to produce independent 
random outcomes it is common to assume that these processes generate exactly that.  
This is equivalent to assuming that ( )1 ,...,1m m=θ  almost surely.  In this case, if x  
is exchangeable then the elements of  are independent with x ( ) 1p x m=  so that, as 
is widely known, prediction is arbitrary. 
 
6.  An alternative approach to modelling almost uniform sequences 
 
Contrary to the common approach, it is the authors’ belief that some processes, 
such as the rolling of a die or the tossing of a coin produce outcomes that may not be 
perfectly uniform, in the sense that the long-run proportions of outcomes may differ.  
After all, in order to distinguish between the faces of a die or coin, these faces must be 
made to be non-identical so that the items themselves must be non-symmetric.  This 
non-symmetry gives us plausible reason to believe that the long run proportions of 
outcomes may not be equal.  We therefore diverge from the common approach by 
instead assuming that θ  is unknown and may therefore be biased towards some 
outcome.  Of course, in the absence of information regarding which way the process 
is likely to be biased we may reasonably assume that θ  is exchangeable.  Again it is 
the authors’ belief that this assumption is reasonable in the context of processes such 
as the rolling of a die or the tossing of a coin.  Of course, this assumption does not 
preclude the common approach.  Rather, we diverge from the common approach by 
making some assumption that corresponds to our contemplation of the possibility of 
bias in the random process.  Either of the following captures this notion: 
 
DEFINITION 2 (Prior non-degeneracy): If a priori there is some positive probability 
that the elements of θ  are all positive and not all equal we say that θ  is non-
degenerate. 
 
DEFINITION 3 (Posterior non-degeneracy): If a posteriori there is some positive 
probability that the positive elements of kxθ  are not all equal we say that kxθ  is 
non-degenerate.  
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7.  A useful stochastic ordering 
 
Following Fishburn (1980) and suppressing notation of the order of domination we 
have the following definition of first order stochastic dominance. 
 
DEFINITION 4 (First order stochastic dominance): If ( ) (P x t P y t> ≥ > )  for all t  
we say that x  stochastically dominates  (written as y x y; ).  Moreover, if x y;  and 
additionally  for some t( ) (P x t P y t′> > > )′ ′  we say that x  strictly stochastically 
dominates  (written as y x y; ). 
 
THEOREM 1: If  and x θ  are both exchangeable then: 
(a) if  then an n≥ b a k b kθ θx ; x
b
; and 
(b) if  and either an n> θ  or | kxθ  are non-degenerate then a k b kθ θx x; . 
 
PROOF: Since  is exchangeable, it follows from the representation theorem of de 
Finetti (1937/1964) that: 
x
( ) ( )
1
i k
m
n
k i
i
p θ
=
=∏ xx θ . 
Let 
θ  be the permutation of θ  with uθ  swapped with vθ .  Since θ  is exchangeable, 
for all 0aθ >  we have: 
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(a) If  then the integrand in an n≥ b ( )1  is non-negative over the range of the integral 
(that is, the range of the indicator).  It follows that ( ) ( )a k bP t P tθ θ> ≥ >x xk  
for all t  so that a k b kθ θx ; x
b
 which was to be shown. 
(b) If  then the integrand in an n> ( )1  is strictly positive over the range of the 
integral (that is, the range of the indicator).  Also, from Lemma 1 (see Appendix) 
we have ( ) 0a b kP θ θ> x >  so that ( ) 0a b kP tθ θ′> ≥ >x  for some t .  It follows 
that 
′
( ) (a k bP t P tθ θ′> > >x x )k′  for some t′  so that a k b kθ θx ; x  which was to 
be shown.   
 
COROLLARY 1 (Reverse gambler’s belief): If  and x θ  are both exchangeable then: 
(a) if  then an n≥ b ( ) ( )p a p b≥ ; and 
(b) if  and either an n> b θ  or kxθ  are non-degenerate then ( ) (p a p b> ) . 
 
PROOF: Since  is exchangeable, it follows from the representation theorem that x
(1 , ~ Mu 1,k kx + x )θ θ  so that ( ) ( ) ( )E a b kp a p b θ θ− = − x .  The proof then follows 
from the stochastic dominance findings of Theorem 1 using Fishburn (1980).   
 
Thus the exchangeability of  and x θ  is sufficient to preclude the gambler’s belief.  
Moreover, the addition of either non-degeneracy assumption then necessitates the 
reverse gambler’s belief.  This immediately gives us an optimal prediction method: 
namely, that we should predict one of the outcomes that has occurred the most in our 
observations.  We call this method the frequent outcome approach. 
 
8.  The frequent outcome approach 
 
It is easy to show —under the assumptions of Theorem 1(b)— that under the 
frequent outcome approach, unless we have observed all outcomes the same number 
of times (including none, as is the case a priori), the probability of successful 
prediction is strictly greater than 1 m .  This result calls into question the fairness of 
some so-called fair bets that are predicated on an assumption of independence 
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between outcomes.  The above results suggest that from a purely monetary 
perspective, we should accept so-called fair bets that are predicated on the outcomes 
of almost uniform sequences. 
Of course, in commercial gambling situations, we are rarely presented with a fair 
bet1; rather, there is usually a profit loading.  Whether or not we should accept such a 
bet depends upon weighing the degree to which we believe that the long-run 
proportions may be biased against the magnitude of the profit loading.  Such an 
analysis requires further assumptions.  Since the random processes in commercial 
gambling are designed to be very close to uniform, we would generally expect that the 
profit loading will outweigh any advantage gained by the frequent outcome approach 
in all but exceptional cases; thus the above analysis may be of little value.  However, 
there are a vast number of statistical endeavors that involve processes that are 
designed to be uniform, not all of which involve adverse profit or utility weightings.  
The real value of the frequent outcome approach lies in these situations. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
In scrutinising probabilistic beliefs, as with any application of logic, it is rather 
unfair to impute to the believer an unsound argument (which they have not 
explicated) as a basis for rejecting their beliefs.  It may very well be that gamblers 
rely on the gambler’s belief or the reverse under erroneous logical arguments.  
However, what we have shown is that in some situations the reverse gambler’s belief 
arises as the optimal rational behaviour from reasonable assumptions about random 
processes.  In particular, if we contemplate the possibility of bias in a random process 
designed to produce independent uniform random outcomes then we should reject the 
common approach that prediction is arbitrary in favour of the frequent outcome 
approach. 
 
                                                          
1 …though this is not unheard of.  In Australia for example, casinos and other gaming establishments 
offer a gambling game called two-up at fair odds (that is, the odds are fair under the common approach) 
every ANZAC day (25 April). 
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Appendix: Non-degeneracy conditions for Theorem 1 
 
Theorem 1(b) requires some assumption that ensures that ( ) 0a b kP θ θ> x > .  In this 
Appendix we show that the addition of either non-degeneracy assumption is sufficient 
for this condition. 
 
LEMMA 1: If  and x θ  are both exchangeable and either θ  or kxθ  is non-
degenerate, then ( ) 0a b kP θ θ> x >  for all a b≠  such that . 0an >
 
PROOF: It is easily shown that the non-degeneracy of θ  implies the non-degeneracy 
of kxθ ; it is therefore sufficient to proceed for the latter case.  Suppose —in 
contradiction to the Lemma— that ( ) 0a b kP θ θ> x = .  It can be shown that, since x  
and θ  are exchangeable we then have ( ), 0, 0a j a j kP θ θ θ θ 0≠ > > =x  for all .  
But since  this contradicts the non-degeneracy of 
j a≠
0an > kxθ .  By contradiction it 
follows that ( ) 0a b kP θ θ> x >  which was to be shown.   
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